MLP Managements Talk Business

MLP managements have been verbose in the last couple of weeks. This is mostly due to the fact that it’s earnings season and conference calls provide an opportunity for investors to obtain additional color from senior executives. It’s the topic of our March newsletter which will be published on Tuesday, but there are many more interesting statements than the newsletter can accommodate.

The elephant in the MLP room is whether distributions will be maintained. Some of the yields are almost willfully defiant, in that they challenge the analyst to hold an opinion. For example, Energy Transfer Equity (ETE) yields 16.7% as of Friday’s close. This is almost certainly a temporary yield; bears will argue it is unsustainable and the distribution will be cut, while bulls will maintain that it is secure. A year from now ETE will probably have moved sharply in one direction or another depending on which view prevails. It is hard to be ambivalent about a 16.7% yield. This is a market that demands strong opinions. Some simple Math shows that if you buy a security yielding 16.7% and over the following year its yield drops by 2% due to price appreciation (reliably paying that 16.7% yield for a year will likely draw in new buyers), your total return is 30%. MLPs should offer this type of possible return, because recent weeks have shown that a 16.7% yield can be offset by a few bad days. But considering the paucity of return potential across other asset classes, it’s hard to see how any serious investor can evaluate her choices without thinking pretty hard about this sector. You may reject a possible 30% one year return as not worth the risk or unattainable, but a failure to consider it is lazy. A 16.7% yield challenges the observer to investigate further.

ETE’s CEO Kelcy Warren naturally maintains that the payout is secure, allowing himself virtually no wiggle room. While asserting that no distribution cuts were contemplated across the Energy Transfer complex, he said, “Our distribution cuts are not required at ETE. And we take our obligation to our unitholders very, very seriously. We have a duty to maintain our distributions. But everybody knows, obviously, that’s an option to the extent of that we need access to distributions to maintain our financial health at ETE; would we reach in to that bucket, it would be the last one we’d reach to, but it’s certainly possible.” Of course, no CEO highlights the likelihood of a cut until it’s done, at which time it appears inevitable. We’ve made our bet, because managements at ETE and other businesses are reducing capex, eliminating their need for new equity and paying close attention to the ability of cashflows to service debt and continue distributions. They are generally doing the right thing. So we side with Kelcy. But it’s also true that while a distribution cut represents a betrayal of your investors, if the cash is used to fund accretive growth projects so as to avoid the dilution from issuing additional equity, as Kinder Morgan (KMI) argued, there’s nothing theoretically destructive to value. On December 8, the day KMI announced its dividend cut, the stock closed at $15.72 and is now at $17.76. Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) doesn’t need stocks that pay high dividends; their challenge is finding good places to invest their cash, and KMI’s subsequent reliance on internally generated cash to finance growth probably made them more attractive in Omaha.

Cheniere’s LNG export facility in Sabine Pass, LA exported its first batch of natural gas last week. The Wall Street Journal published an insightful article highlighting the attractiveness of the U.S. as a supplier to countries such as Lithuania, who are tiring of Gazprom’s hard-line negotiations that typically start on New Year’s Eve when the threat of a mid-winter supply disruption hangs over the price discussions.Satellite view of US at night showing North Dakota, home to shale gas, is aglow at night

The photo is a satellite shot of the U.S. at night, and while most of the lights are in population areas the white box highlights North Dakota where there are few people but lots of gas flaring. Oneok’s CEO Terry Spencer commented this week, “So flared gas, let me just tell you, it’s not an exact science. And it’s quite possible we could have more flared gas than we actually believe we have, because every time we turn on a compressor station it seems like the wells behind that particular compressor station outperform our expectations. Time and time again, more gas is showing up than what we thought.” Since flaring is both bad for the environment as well as commercially destructive, those in favor of additional infrastructure to capture this lost output must include environmentalists, involved E&P companies and indirectly the Lithuanian electricity consumer. The U.S. is on its way to becoming a significant exporter of hydrocarbons, and its reliability will compare favorably with many of the competing exporters. If you choose not to buy from unstable regions or unpredictable kleptocracies, your choices of supply can be limited.  The shifting geopolitics is the long game, but is hardly reflected in today’s asset prices.

We are invested in BRK, ETE, KMI and OKE

 

Real Money Moves Into Real Assets

It was a busy week of news in Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs). Although there were several earnings announcements, perhaps most notable was the disclosure of new investments by Berkshire Hathaway (BRK), David Tepper’s hedge fund Appaloosa and George Soros in much maligned Kinder Morgan (KMI). Appaloosa also disclosed holdings in KMI warrants, which expire at $40 in May 2017 so represent an exceptionally optimistic view of the company given its current price of $17.37. They also disclosed new holdings in Energy Transfer Partners (ETP) and the Alps ETF (AMLP). These purchases all took place sometime during 4Q15, coincidentally when I added personally to my MLP investments. So these three investment giants shared the disbelief of many at the continued MLP rout. Nonetheless, for those who draw comfort from the decisions of others, it was a good start to the week.

Taxes play an important role for MLP investors. Tax barriers impede many institutional investors from allocating, and most mutual funds and ETFs face a substantial drag from corporate income tax, so it’s worth spending a moment on how these issues likely affected these three investors. First of all, KMI is not an MLP but is instead a C-corp, so there are no impediments to investing in them. In any event BRK is an insurance company, one of the few classes of institutional investor who can easily hold MLPs because they are taxable whereas most institutional equity investors (pension funds, endowments and foundations, sovereign wealth funds) are not.

ETP is a partnership, and Appaloosa doesn’t disclose which of its funds invested. Appaloosa could hold ETP through a domestic partnership since its investors would generally be U.S. taxable. Most hedge fund money is offshore though, so holding ETP through, say, a Cayman vehicle is more problematic. When I was at JPMorgan investing offshore capital in hedge funds 10-15 years ago we used total return swaps executed with a prime broker. These provide the economic exposure to the MLP without the tax problems, but tax opinions have fluctuated on these over the years since the swap has no true purpose beyond tax management. Or Appaloosa may have created a blocker corporation to hold ETP on behalf of its offshore fund and paid taxes at that level. We can only guess, but what is clear is that they regard the potential upside as worth the cost of handling the tax issues.

The Oklahoma Teachers Retirement System evidently feels the same way about the return potential, since they recently added $250 million to their MLP exposure. As a tax-exempt U.S. institution, they may face Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) through their MLP investments. Since tax-exempt institutions generally like to avoid paying taxes, UBIT represents an impediment to holding MLPs. However, they are not prohibited from making such investments, and Oklahoma Teachers may have concluded that the returns even after UBIT remain attractive, or their tax analysis may have shown that the ineligible income from MLPs falls below the threshold for a tax liability given their $14BN in funds.

In any event, all of the above shows that institutional investors are beginning to take advantage of the market dislocation in MLPs, and indeed began to do so several months ago. As we wrote in The 2015 MLP Crisis; Why and What’s Next, the comparative rigidity of the traditional investor base was exposed by the rapid exit of retail investors from MLP mutual funds and ETFs. It’s creating an opportunity. MLPs will not reclaim their place as a stable source of income anytime soon, but an asset class with double digit yields offers the potential for 30%+ one year returns assuming (1) distributions keep being paid, and (2) the constant paying of distributions leads to inflows driving yields lower by a couple of percent. Of course, the potential upside comes with the possibility of losing 10% in a week, as we’ve seen. However, it’s hard to identify another asset class that offers that kind of potential return. And it’s worth noting that investors such as Oklahoma see attractive returns even with the hurdle of potential tax expense. For investors  in a RIC-compliant MLP fund that doesn’t pay tax, such as ours, it’s a simpler decision.

We are invested in BRK and KMI

Comparing Conoco Phillips with MLPs

Chart Blog Feb 14 2016Around ten days ago Conoco Phillips (COP) and Magellan Midstream (MMP) both released their 4Q15 earnings, and held conference calls on February 4th to discuss them. This coincidence of reporting is about all they have in common, but it caused us to look a bit more closely at an energy company (COP) that truly has commodity price exposure and what it’s doing about it.

COP announced a two-thirds cut in their dividend, a completely understandable move because they really are financing it with debt. The problem with an Exploration and Production (E&P) company like COP is that they have to keep replacing their assets. Hydrocarbons produced are assets no longer available to generate future revenues, and so they keep investing in new future production. Consequently, COP’s $3.3BN of 2015 EBITDA was dwarfed by $10BN of capex resulting in negative free cashflow (FCF). They lost $3.50 per share. The company closed out the year with half the cash with which it started ($2.4BN versus $5.1BN) and on top of that their proved reserves fell by 19%, from 8.9 BBOE (Billions of Barrels of Oil Equivalent) to 8.2 BBOE. Incidentally, COP’s 2015 Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization (DD&A) was $9BN, pretty close to their capex. Their new investments were approximately equal to the hydrocarbon assets they extracted and sold. In 2016 their DD&A is likely to exceed their capex by $2BN. They are running very hard and not even moving forward. 2015 was a year COP will happily forget – they lost money, used up half their cash and saw their reserves drop. They have nothing to show for it.

It’s hard to know how to value COP, and especially hard to compare them with an MLP (which is where we’re going). Neither their free cashflow yield nor their P/E multiple are meaningful since both are negative. On an Enterprise Value/EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) basis they’re priced at 15.4X based on 2016 guidance, which incorporates a 36% slashing of their capex budget to $6.4BN. This multiple flatters COP and all E&P companies though, because it backs out depletion and depreciation although their future EBITDA is dependent on continuing growth capex to replace what’s gone.

COP’s dividend cut was a belated acknowledgment of the obvious, which is that they don’t generate any cash to pay a dividend so are funding it with debt. In fact, COP operates in the way that many MLP critics assert is prevalent with midstream infrastructure businesses, although there are substantial differences between the assets of an E&P company (hydrocarbon reserves which are used up) and pipelines which last for decades and don’t require perennial replacement (although they do require maintenance).

MMP reported solid earnings and generates Distributable Cash Flow (DCF), a measure somewhat analogous to COP’s FCF (although MLP critics will disagree on this point). MMP’s DCF covers their distribution, whereas COP really has no business paying a dividend. MMP’s EV/EBITDA, in which their EBITDA is more reflective of FCF generation because its assets are not naturally depleting, is 15.3X on 2016 guidance, roughly the same as COP’s.

Now it’s true that COP has tracked the Alerian Index (AMZX) more reliably than MMP, which is to say MLPs have behaved like an enormous cash-consuming owner of depleting assets rather than the cash-generative owner of sustainable assets that they are (chart source: SL Advisors). The few E&P names in the Alerian index have been dumped following distribution cuts (reliable distributions are one of the  the rules for inclusion), so AMZX no longer includes E&P businesses. MMP has outperformed AMZX, and yet its valuation fails to differentiate it from COP. It has been dragged down by its sector.

We continue to think that the ongoing collapse in MLPs is reflective of their financing model and rigidity of the investor base (see The 2015 MLP Crash; Why and What’s Next). Traditional MLP investors are U.S. taxable, high net worth (HNW) individuals. The arrival of smaller retail investors through mutual funds and ETFs for a time met the increased need for growth capex that traditional MLP investors, who like their distributions, didn’t want to finance by reinvesting everything they received. The retail investor was the marginal buyer, for a while. The surprise has been that upon his exit, new sources of financing have required a substantial price discount. MLP proponents have written for years about the institutionalization of the sector. The evidence clearly shows that once you exclude institutional money managers of retail money, the true institutional investors of public equities (pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and foundations) are not natural MLP investors because of the tax barriers.

Deciding the sector is cheap and then identifying a manager and implementing is a deliberate process, and while we see some evidence that it is under way, the buyer of an MLP today is most likely still the traditional HNW taxable investor. Given the collapse in prices, he’s not very enthusiastic. In this way, the MLP sector is unlike any other sector of the U.S. equity markets where capital can move in more opportunistically. Eventually, institutional investors will commit more meaningful capital, but it takes time. Most of the publicly listed MLP funds are terribly tax-inefficient (see The Sky High Expenses of MLP Funds), although not ours. As well as selecting a manager to oversee an MLP portfolio, a non-tax paying pension fund must decide to file a tax return (as direct holdings of MLPs would require). These are not trivial decisions. Count the cheerleaders for the “institutionalization” of the MLP sector among those whose views were aspirational rather than realistic.

We are invested in MMP.

The Math of a Distribution-Financed Buyback

We’ve been looking for examples of what happens to a pipeline contract when the Exploration & Production (E&P) company is under financial stress or files for bankruptcy. The question of what happens to long term contracts with Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) in such cases is becoming one of the more notable concerns, both for MLP investors and for those who would otherwise buy MLPs if they could get comfort on this issue.

It’s a pretty fundamental concern. Pipelines are immobile, and as a result they’re not built without a high degree of assurance that they’ll be used and paid for. What happens when this goes wrong?

Past cycles don’t provide much guidance, because disputes have been rare. We noted a couple of weeks ago (see How Do You Break a Pipeline Contract?) the case of Essar Steel Limited, an Indian steel company, which lost in Federal court when trying to void an agreement to take previously contracted natural gas.

This brought us to Crestwood Midstream, a Gathering and Processing (G&P) MLP with a very depressed stock price and at least one E&P customer (Quicksilver Resources) that is in bankruptcy. If the riskiest place in the energy sector is drilling for crude oil or natural gas at a time of abundance, the next riskiest must be providing the G&P facilities that are the first step in moving that output through the nation’s pipeline network. A single pipe to a single well has a single purpose, and if the well owner ceases to pump natural gas or merely threatens to, the G&P MLP that owns the pipe will pay attention.

Interestingly, Quicksilver continues to utilize Crestwood’s G&P services. U.S. bankruptcy law is intended to maximize the going concern value of the enterprise to the benefit of the creditors, and in most cases the assets of a failed E&P company have more value if they’re still producing. As we understand bankruptcy law, contracts that are above market can be rejected or re-priced to be market-competitive, but individual clauses of contracts cannot be selectively altered. Moreover, an MLP providing a service to a bankrupt company cannot be compelled to continue providing that service if payments are not made.Broken-Contract-Feb 7 2016 Blog

Contracts between MLPs and their customers are not made public. However, there was an interesting conclusion to one between SandRidge Energy (SD) and Occidental Petroleum (OXY). SD is an E&P company that, while not yet bankrupt, recently delisted from the NYSE. They had a contract with OXY to deliver certain volumes of CO2 and had been failing to deliver the committed amount. Under the terms of the contract, SD had racked up non-performance penalties of $113MM that were set to continue accruing. To get out of this commitment, SD gave OXY natural gas E&P assets, cash and associated midstream infrastructure. This was evidently cheaper for SD than seeking to break the contract, and shows both that companies continue to make decisions on the basis that contracts will be upheld in court but also that OXY found sufficient value in the transferred assets to satisfy their claim.

Returning to Crestwood, their prospects will tell us a lot about how such issues get resolved, because they have other G&P assets and potentially other distressed customers. The degree of financial stress they’re facing is a topic of considerable disagreement. 90% of their 2015 EBITDA was from Fixed-Fee or Take-or-Pay contracts, which traditionally involve little risk of non-payment or commodity price exposure. CEQP’s current yield of 43% reflects substantial concern among investors that 2015’s $560MM EBIDTA will drop in the future due to stress among its customers. However, it’s also possible their EBITDA will be higher in 2016. CEQP has a supportive sponsor in First Reserve who is funding an expansion project in the Permian Basin in West Texas via a 50/50 JV, and owns 16% of CEQP’s units. CEQP used to have the typical GP/MLP structure, but last year combined into one entity which eliminated the cash payments under Incentive Distribution Rights thus leaving more of the cashflow for the LP unitholders.

In fact, CEQP might represent a case study of the outcomes when your E&P customers falter, because CEQP does operate close to the wellhead where financial stress is most acute. Management is more confident than the market that their Distributable Cash Flow (DCF) will continue to cover their $5.50 annualized distribution which for the past four quarters was 1.02X. Hence CEQP LP units currently yield 43%, a level unlikely to be available a year from now; either the doubters will be right and the distribution will be cut, or the stock price will move sharply higher.

Raging Capital makes a persuasive case that the stock is cheap, and in December published an open letter with a supporting presentation advocating value-creating steps management could take, beginning with a cut in the distribution. Reasoning that a 43% distribution yield reflects healthy skepticism among investors regarding its continuation as well as the likely absence of risk-averse income-seeking investors, cutting it in half to 20% would still provide an eye-catching yield while freeing up cash to buy back stock. Saving $2.25 in annual distributions on 68.5MM shares would free up $38MM quarterly, enough to repurchase 2.9MM shares a quarter or 5% of the public float while building ~$9M in coverage (i.e by no longer paying distribution on shares repurchased). Within two years they could shrink the public float by 38%, at which point their DCF even if unchanged would be $8.57 per unit. It’s doubtful CEQP could remain anywhere near $14, since that would represent a DCF multiple of less than 2X. Or, to take a more extreme case: suppose CEQP eliminated its distribution. The stock would presumably collapse since MLPs invariably do at such times. If it dropped $5 to $7, within a year the company could have used the redirected cashflow to repurchase 75% of their units, virtually the entire public float. All they would have done is returned the same amount of cash to investors through a buyback instead of distributions. At that point with a greatly reduced public float the DCF/unit would be $21. It illustrates the absurdity of maintaining such a high dividend yield.

A key assumption is that CEQP’s customers keep performing on their contracts, or if not that they are replaced by customers that do. There’s clearly some downside risk on this issue, but CEQP offers some fairly dramatic optionality. It is a small investment of ours.

Nothing herein is intended to be legal advice. For legal advise you should seek your own legal counsel.

 

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